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1. Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are high on the agenda of policy makers, academics and
business firms. Now that knowledge and immaterial products are becoming more and more
important in the world economy, IPRs are more crucial than ever. With rapid technological
developments in many fields, policy makers are asking themselves how to adapt the existing
systems of IPRs to the changing circumstances. What guidance can economic theory give
them in this process?
In order to provide the answer to this question, it is necessary first to establish the
economic function of patents. That will be the first question that this paper tries to analyze. It
will be argued that patents, more than other forms of IPRs (such as copyrights and
trademarks) are important for the dynamic performance of the economy.
The second question is how economic analysis can guide the design of a patent system.
Here, issues such as the patent length (duration), breadth (scope of protection) and height
(novelty requirements) are analyzed. Although there are many formal models of patent
system design that can help in outlining the relevant economic processes, these do not offer,
as will be argued below, very concrete guidance. The main reason is that these models are too
abstract to be applied in practical terms. It will be argued that only detailed case studies of
existing patents in combination with the study of technological systems can provide practical
insights into how broad patents should be. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper
to delve into the details of the (legal) practice of IPRs, or outline detailed technological trends
in relation to IPRs. Given the scope of the paper, the analysis will be limited to discussing the
main, general insights economic theory can deliver.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines some
developments in the economic theory on growth. It will be argued that patents play a crucial
role in modern growth (theory). The section will also introduce the concept of technology
spillovers. Section 3 will outline the economic functions of patents, and also introduce the
concepts of patent breadth and patent length. Section 4 will come back to the issue of
spillovers, and their link to patents. The issue of patent breadth will be analyzed taking into
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3account the economic importance of spillovers. Section 5 will summarize the main line of
argument.
2. Technology and the economy
The importance of technology for economic growth is obvious to anybody who has even a
vague notion of the history of technology or the history of the world economy. The prolonged
growth of GDP per capita (which, admittedly, is an imperfect measure of what matters for the
quality of human life) since the (first) Industrial Revolution was made possible by a
combination of entirely new processes and new products, which kept being introduced into
the economy at what appears to have been an increasing rate (see, e.g., L nde , 1969,
Maddison, 1991 and Freeman and Soete, 1997).
Despite the load of historical evidence, (mainstream) economic theory, however, until
very recently, was not very comfortable with the relation between economic growth and
technology. Formal theorists as economists are today, they were rather uneasy with the
‘qualitative’ work by ‘pre-modern’ economists such as Marx and Schumpeter1, who had kept
closer links with the historical evidence and given technology a central role in their analysis.
The dominant theory of economic growth (Solow, 1956) was based on the cornerstone of
all modern economic analysis, namely that of ‘decreasing marginal returns’.2 This no io
refers to the fact that if one keeps adding more and more capital (machines, buildings) to a
production process, the additional value added generated by this capital will keep falling,
until it eventually becomes zero. This concept, which dates back to Mar hall (1890), is very
central in economic analysis because it enables the theorist to calculate the outcome of a
rational decision making process. For example, it is possible to calculate the price that a firm
will charge for its product when decreasing marginal returns apply, while this is generally
impossible to do if this assumption is not made.
However, when marginal returns keep falling until they are zero, long-run economic
growth is only possible if some ‘exogenous’ factor is assumed to be present. This could, for
example, be technical change that falls as ‘manna from heaven’, or is given by ‘God and the
engineers’. Such exogenous factors, by definition, are not affected by economic decisions,
and that is why economic models did not have very much to say about growth.
It was only recently (e.g., Romer, 1986, Grossman and Helpman, 1991) that economists
were willing to admit that with technological change that is motivated by economic goals, the
assumption of zero marginal returns in the long run was unable to maintain. Investment in
technology and R&D is a way to avoid them, and to keep returns to capital positive in the
long run. This opened the way for a wholly new class of so-called ‘endogenous growth
models’, in which long-run growth can be explained without resorting to exogenous
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4technological change. In these models, firms’ decisions on research and development (R&D)
are taken into account, and patents on the outcomes of R&D play a large role.
Although not all of the new growth models agree on this, some (e.g., Grossman and
Helpman, 1991) argue that the mere existence of R&D by firms is not enough to solve the
problem that decreasing marginal returns pose for economic growth. They argue that long-
run positive economic growth is only possible when technological change displays so-called
‘externalities’ or ‘spillovers’. By this notion, they refer to the idea that a technological
invention is not only of use to its inventor, but also to other firms in the economy. The nature
of technology, as will be argued in more detail in the next section, makes it possible that
other firms than the original inventor can use (parts of) it as well.
Grossman and Helpman, as well as other ‘new growth theorists’ argue that without
spillovers, long-run economic growth will cease. Although their models, as well as this
specific proposition, remain to be tested empirically (e.g., Jones, 1995), their assertion clearly
illustrates the importance of the spillover concept for the economy. The question arises,
however, why a firm would invest in R&D if other firms may reap (part of) the benefits of
this investment. Obviously, this is where a system of intellectual property rights (IPRs), more
specifically a patent system, comes in.
3. Patents as incentives for R&D
3.1. The appropriability problem
In a sense, technological knowledge is an economic good in which firms (and governments)
invest money. Competition between firms is based on product quality (including service), and
price. In both of these aspects of the competitive process, technology plays an important role.
The price of a good depends on productivity and the costs of inputs such as labour, raw
materials, machines and buildings. By enhancing productivity, technological change may
lead to a dramatic fall of the price charged by the firm that implements such process
innovations. Other firms in the same are then forced to drop their prices as well, or else they
will be driven out of the market. How this may lead to dramatic price falls is illustrated well
by an historical example quoted in Freeman and Soete (1997) (p. 60). Over the period 1870-
1898, the price of steel (in $ per ton) fell by 83%, or an average of almost 3% per year. This
tremendous drop coincided with a period in which important innovations in steel making
(most notably the Bessemer process) were applied in the American economy.
Investment in technological change may also be aimed at product innovation. Moore’s law
is perhaps the most famous example of rapid product innovation. Gordon Moore, the co-
founder and chairman of the Intel corporation, predicted in the 1960s that the complexity
(measured as the number of components put on one chip) of so-called integrated circuits
would double each year. For the firm that was leading this development (i.e., Intel), this high
rate of product innovation led to a dominating market position, which, nowadays, is
challenged by only a handful of competitors.
5It would thus appear from such anecdotal evidence that firms have more than enough
reason to invest in research and development (R&D) in order to increase their competitive
position. Why then is a system of intellectual property rights necessary to stimulate
investment in R&D? The answer to this problem lies in the fact that technology has a number
of special characteristics that are not often found in other economic goods. A normal
economic good (say, an orange) is both rival and excludable. This means that only one person
can consume or use the orange (rivalry), and the supplier of the orange can exclude persons
from consuming it (i.e., those who are not prepared to pay for the orange). These two
characteristics, which hold for the large majority of all goods in modern economies, ensure
that these goods will be produced in a market economy. A farmer is willing to grow oranges
because, due to the rival and excludable character of the orange, she is able to sell the oranges
on the market, and earn a profit.
Technological knowledge is a good for which the characteristics of rivalry and
excludability do not hold perfectly. Imagine a situation without intellectual property rights. If
a firm would invest to develop a new chip, its competitors would be able to copy the
knowledge embodied in this circuit by buying a single unit of the new product, and reverse
engineer it. In other words, the knowledge embodied in the chip is non-rival (the fact that one
firm uses it does not imply that other firms cannot use the same knowledge), and is non-
excludable (there is no way the inventor can exclude others from using the knowledge she
developed, except for the trivial case that the knowledge is not used in any way).
There would thus be no incentive for a firm to invest in such knowledge. Without
protection of its intellectual property, other firms can free ride on the efforts of the inventor,
and, hence, assuming that imitation is cheaper than developing the invention, put the new
product on the market for a far lower price than the original inventor. This is why non-rivalry
and non-excludability poses a problem in terms of incentives to produce these goods.
Besides technological knowledge, there are a number of other goods that have the
characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability. Examples are national defense and clean
air (one cannot exclude individual citizens from either of those goods, and they can be
consumed by numerous people at the same time). In economic theory, these goods are said to
be characterized by market failure, i.e., a free market economy will either not produce these
goods at all, or produce them in quantities far too small for the existing demand. National
defense and clean air (as well as other examples one may think of) are goods that are usually
supplied by public governments. This is why these goods are called public goods.
However, public provision is not the only way in which market failure of non-rival and
non-excludable goods may be solved. The system of IPRs can be considered as an institution
that tries to solve the problem of market failure by providing private producers with
incentives to supply public goods. As such, a system of IPRs is thus one of the possibilities to
solve the problem of market failures. The next section will provide an overview of all of
these mechanisms, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of IPRs (relative to the
other means to solve market failure) in some detail.
63.2. Ways of stimulating invention
David (1993) discusses the three P’s of trying to solve market failure in the are of
technological change: Patronage, Procurement and Property Rights (or Patents). All three
mechanisms are actually used to stimulate the development of new knowledge in practice,
although they are related to different parts of the R&D infrastructure. The first P, Patronage,
refers to the process where government finances a group of researchers to undertake R&D,
and thus provide new knowledge. This is the system that is most widely used for basic
science, where publicly financed universities or public research labs play a large role in
pushing forward the frontier of knowledge. Note that this is similar to the solution of market
failure in the case of standard public goods such as defense.
Procurement refers to the process where governments engage in contracts over the
development of a specific piece of knowledge. Thus, public authorities may identify a
specific problem for which a technical solution seems feasible, and they contract a specific
group of researchers to develop this solution. Of course, often, the same researchers who
work in universities of government labs are engaged in competitive bids for government
procured research projects, so that the two systems overlap in practice.
As David (1993, p. 32) notes, the procedures of procurement and patronage suffer from
the problem of setting the prices right. How much should governments invest in research
grants to universities, and how much should they be prepared to pay for a specific project
undertaken to solve a predefined technical problem? These are questions that are difficult, if
not impossible, to answer. The third P, Property rights, provides at least a theoretical way out
of this problem, for a special class of technological knowledge.
A part of knowledge generated through research and development leads to possibilities for
products and processes that have commercial value. With a system of property rights, i.e., a
(temporary) legal monopoly granted to one firm, these goods can be supplied on the free
market. Thus, a system of property rights leaves to the market to decide what a ‘fair’ price for
technological knowledge embodied in a product or process is. The incentive problem is
solved by legally excluding others than the inventor (or patent holder) from using the
technical information. Thus the patent holder is enabled to make a profit on her research.
Obviously, there are also certain disadvantages to granting a monopoly. With ‘normal’
economic goods (i.e., rival and excludable goods), economic theory clearly shows that a
market with many suppliers and many buyers produces more welfare than a market in which
only one (monopoly) or a few (oligopoly) suppliers are active. Put in simple terms, monopoly
firms charge too high prices from a societal point of view. This is why public governments
often pursue an active anti-trust and pro-competition policy. The trade-off between the
advantages of a monopoly provided by patents and the disadvantages is often discussed as the
trade-off between static efficiency (stimulating competition) and dynamic efficiency
(stimulating invention through patents) (see, e.g., Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). The trade-off
also plays an important role in the tension between government policies aimed at science and
technology and anti-trust policy. In the context of European integration, for example, strict
7rules have been set to technology policy in order to ensure that it does not intervene with
competition policy.3
Besides the problem of monopolies charging a too high price, there are also a number of
other disadvantages to the patent system. David (1993) discusses the so-called ‘common-
pool’ problem. This refers to the notion that firms often compete for the same invention,
which leads to so-called patent races, in which the winner typically takes all (see, e.g.,
Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). The common pool problem presents two problems from the
point of view of social benefits and costs. According to David (1993), first, “it is likely that
from the viewpoint of society there will be too many contestants in the races for priority in
discovery and invention. Those entering consider only what they individually stand to gain,
and they do not take into account the effect of their participation on the expected outcomes of
all the other competitors” (p. 33). These effects on the outcomes of other contestants are
obviously negative, for the more competitors there are, the smaller the probability for each of
them to be first. In other words, when potential inventors fish a common pool of knowledge,
resources will be spent in a wasteful way (from the point of view of the total economy).
Second, again citing David (1993), “there is a tendency for private rents to be dissipated in
the scramble for the prize of priority and all that it would bring. The private value of arriving
at a new finding a little sooner than the second-place contestant is likely to exceed greatly the
benefit that society would derive from the slight advantage in the date of discovery” (p. 33).
Thus, although patents do not only entail positive effects on welfare, most economic
treatments on the subject would conclude that overall, the benefits of a patent system are
positive (e.g., van Dijk, 1994, Scherer and Ross, 1990). For example, Mazzoleni and Nelson
(1998, p. 281) conclude “In some areas, patent rights certainly are economically and socially
productive in generating invention, spreading technological knowledge, inducing innovation
and commercialization, and providing some degree of order in the development of broad
technological prospects. However, in many areas of technology this is not the case”. This
conclusion leaves, however, at least two issues to be resolved. First, whether patents (or IPRs
in general) are efficient means of reaching their goal (stimulating invention and
commercialization thereof), and second, whether anything can be said about the design of
patents.
With regard to the first question, it has been argued that firms have al ernative options for
appropriating the return to R&D investment, and that these alternative options are often used
more than patents. Levin, Klevorick et al. (1987), in a survey among large firms in the U.S.,
and Arundel and Van de Paal (1995) for European large firms, found that secrecy,
establishing a lead-time, an effective marketing campaign, and learning effects were
measures of protecting knowledge that were considered to be more effective than patents by
many (although not all)  firms. Similar conclusions had been reached in earlier studies such
as Taylor and Silberston (1973). Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) argue that the above
mentioned studies that arrive at the conclusion that patenting is often only a minor tool in
appropriating knowledge are biased towards large firms. Many of the ways in which these
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8large firms appropriate knowledge are closely related to their size (marketing budget,
learning effects), and hence small firms may have to rely more on patents.
Important differences in this respect exist between industries, or the knowledge bases
underlying and the institutions surrounding them. For example, in the pharmaceuticals sector,
due in part to the fact that copying of chemical substances is very precise and rather cheap,
and given that authorities request detailed information about the contents of medicines, patent
protection is considered to be very important. In the electronics sector, short product life
cycles often make patents relatively inefficient, although most of the larger electronic firms
hold large patent portfolios. Thus, the so-called ‘propensity to patent innovations’ differs
considerably between different industries.
With regard to the issue of the design of the patent system, economic analysis has mainly
analyzed the question how an ‘optimal’ patent should be designed. An optimal patent is one
that maximizes the welfare of the invention it concerns, or, in other words, one that strikes
the best balance between the positive and negative effects of patents as outlined above. In this
respect, the issues of patent length (duration of the monopoly right) and patent breadth (scope
of protection) have been widely analyzed.4
Increasing the length of a patent obviously increases the amount of profits the inventor
may draw from her invention, but it also increases the welfare losses due to monopoly power.
Nordhaus (1969) was the first to address the issue of patent length in a formal setting. In his
analysis, the optimal patent length depends on the price elasticity of demand, and the
elasticity of the extent of technical improvements with regard to R&D expenditures. With
higher price elasticity of demand for the new product, the optimal patent length is shorter,
because the high monopoly price implies a large welfare loss. If larger productivity increases
are achieved with a given level of R&D, the optimal length of the patent will also be shorter,
because R&D is cheap, and hence the incentive does not need to be very large.
Following Klemperer (1990), the formal literature mostly considers the issue of patent
breadth in a context of so-called horizontal product differentiation.5 In th s approach,
technological innovation is seen as a process that produces more variants of a consumption
good. Because consumer tastes differ, each new variant creates its own demand, without fully
capturing the market.6 A broad patent then captures a large part of the horizontally
differentiated product space. As in the case of patent length, the optimal breadth depends on a
number of model parameters, such as various elasticities. Van Dijk’s (1994, p. 113)
conclusion that “the exact conditions for choosing an imitation or improvement strategy are
not particularly important because they depend on specific modeling assumptions” in a strict
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9sense refers only to his own model of patent height and breadth, but strikes me as reasonably
valid for the field as a whole.
4. Patents and technology spillovers
The technological knowledge that is described in a patent application, is not only useful to the
patent applicant but also to other inventors in the same field. Although these other inventors
are not allowed to use the patented knowledge in a product or process that will be used for
economic purposes, the knowledge in a patent may still be useful to them in different ways.
For example, this knowledge may give them new ideas for inventions. Also, the knowledge
described in a patent often increases the general stock of knowledge in a field, such as would,
for example, be the case if a patent describes that some technical procedure is possible to
carry out. Also, some patent systems, such as the European one, require the patent applicant
to reveal so-called non-claimable knowledge if this is relevant to the device or procedure
described in the patent.
Thus, even if a patent precludes pure imitation of an invention, it does not rule out all
externalities related to it. The patent provides the inventor with a monopoly that enables her
to generate profits and hence provides an incentive for the research effort, but it leaves certain
aspects of the technological knowledge to be exploited by others than the original inventor.
How much is left to others to explore, and, thus, how much can be appropriated by the
inventor, depends on the breadth of the patent.
The fact that patents, at least patents that are not too broad, leave open externalities, is an
important distinction with other types of IPRs. For example, trademarks and, perhaps to a
lesser extent, copyrights do not induce any externalities, or at least not to the same extent as
patents do. When a firm takes out a trademark, it basically seeks protection for its marketing
activities. Obviously, marketing does not carry the same amount of spillovers than research
and development, although, in some cases, it might be a just as effective means of strategic
advantage for a firm. Given the economic importance of spillovers (or externalities) that was
underlined above, this clearly establishes the special importance of patents as compared to
certain other types of IPRs.7 One could say that a patenting system has important bearing on
the dynamic efficiency (growth potential) of an economy, while this is less obvious for other
types of IPRs.
This also implies that the breadth of patents has important consequences for the growth
potential of the economy. Usually, however, the models of optimal patent design, which were
discussed shortly in the previous section, do not consider these dynamic effects. They are
limited to the static welfare effects of patents, i.e., they compare the welfare costs and
benefits of a patent without taking into account the effect a patent may have on future
innovation (through spillovers). Important exceptions to this are Scotchme  (1991) and
Scotchmer and Green (1990), as well as the less-formal, qualitative literature on patent
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breadth. The latter branch of literature started with early contributions by Kitch (1977) and
Beck (1981), while Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) is a recent contribution.
Taking into account the spillover effect of patents on the productivity of future research,
one is faced with a familiar trade-off. On the one hand, broader patents reduce spillovers to
other firms than the inventor. Although in principle these spillovers could be ‘internalized’ by
the patent holder, i.e., the beneficial effects on future invention could be captured by the
patent holder, this internalization is unlikely to be complete. For example, in case of a
‘general purpose technology’, the scope of the firm that holds the patent is unlikely to cover
the complete spectrum of possible applications of the spillovers, and/or transaction costs to
licensing may be too high to allow efficient spread of the spillovers to other firms. Thus,
broad patents are bad for spillovers, and, hence, bad for dynamic performance of the
economy.
On the other hand, broader patents increase the (potential) pay-off to he patent holder, and
hence the incentive for invention is increased. By increasing the number of inventions,
obviously, also the amount of spillovers is increased. Whether broader patents increase or
decrease the amount of knowledge available for spillovers thus depends on the various
elasticities involved in this process.
How this trade-off turns out, and hence whether or not broad patents are good for dynamic
performance of the economy, is hard to judge in a purely theoretical approach. Without an
idea of the empirical facts, it is likely that such theory runs into the same problems as were
signaled above for the ‘static’ models of patent breadth. The outcome depends on model
parameters, and the models are too abstract to make empirical estimation of the parameters
possible. Thus, case studies of specific sectors, technologies and countries are very useful
with regard to the question of patent breadth.
For example, recent practical discussions in the field of IPRs focus on the scope of
protection that should be offered on inventions in fields such as computer software, integrated
circuits designs and biotechnology (life) (see, e.g., chapters 11-15 in Wallerstein, Mogee et
al., 1993, as well as Van Wijk and Junne, 1993). The general tendency of the discussion has
been to offer more extensive protection for these technological fields than was possible on the
basis of the legal arrangements some years ago (when these technologies were just coming
into existence).
Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) warn against such a trend of broadening patent protection.
They argue that when technological change proceeds in “cumulative systems” (p. 281), broad
patents are potentially hampering to the rate of invention. The danger they see is that an early,
broad patent in such a field locks out firms who do not have access to this patent, especially if
transaction costs for licensing are high. In other words, although they do not use the term
‘spillovers’ or ‘externalities’, they make exactly the same argument against broad patents as
has been made above using the idea of spillovers. Merges and Nelson (1990) discuss a
number of specific examples from the (recent) history of technology to support the case that
broad patents hinder spillovers, due to, among other things, high transaction costs for
licensing.
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I tend to support the Mazzoleni and Nelson conclusion that broad patents are potentially
dangerous. There is no need to use the patent system to aim to internalize all the spillovers of
invention to a single firm (i.e., the inventor). This would essentially come down to
eliminating a large part of the potential benefits to the economy at large, because no single
firm is large enough to fully exhaust the possibilities of important inventions in key
technology fields. The aim of a patent should be to provide a firm with the possibility to
make a fair profit in order to earn back its R&D costs. It is therefore perfectly sound to leave
a large part of the spillovers to outsiders, and thereby increase the overall benefits to the
economy. As was argued in Section 2, this is the basic idea behind modern growth theory, a
part of which argues that without such spillovers, long-run growth would converge to zero.
In many respects, the studies by Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) and Merges and Nelson
(1990) reach conclusions opposite to those in the early contributions by Kitch (1977) and
Beck (1981). These authors were arguing in favour of broad patents, essentially to rule out
inefficiencies in the coordination between many contestants in a patent race following an
early basic patent in a field. They recommend that such an early basic patent should be broad,
so that the firm that holds it may either explore the field on its own, or license the patent to
the other firms that are most promising with regard to success in R&D.
The World Bank (1998), finally, although it argues in general terms for increasing the
breadth of patents on a worldwide scale (the so-called TRIPs agreement, see my other paper
for this conference for more details), warns against too broad protection in the specific field
of gene splicing, on the account that this is a technology with such a broad range of
applications, that patents run the risk of locking out too much spillovers.
5. Conclusions and summary
The economic function of patents is to protect inventors from being imitated, and hence to
provide them with an incentive to perform research and development, and to commercialize
the inventions that stem from it. Patents are one particular way of solving the problem of
market failure that arises because technological knowledge is, to a certain extent, a so-called
public good.
Patents grant their holder a monopoly right to apply or sell a product or process for a
limited period of time. Besides the positive impact of this monopoly on the incentive for
invention, there are also certain negative aspects of such a monopoly. These are mainly
related to the fact that, from a societal point of view, a monopolist producer charges too high
prices for its product, and this causes welfare loss for consumers.
Patents also have an impact on the future rate of invention, because they generate so-called
spillovers as a by-product of the invention process. Examples of spillovers are when an
invention generates an idea (possibly in somebody else’s brain) for a new invention. Such
spillover effects are especially valuable from an economic point of view, because they are an
important impetus to economic growth.
Microeconomic models analyze the beneficial aspects of patents and compare them to the
welfare losses implied by the monopoly. In this way, an ‘optimal’ design of the patent
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system, in terms of the duration (length) of a patent and the scope of protection (breadth) can
be determined. However, these models have two main advantages. First, they do not
generally consider the dynamic aspects of patents, i.e., they do not take into account the
impact of technology spillovers on the future rate of invention (exceptions to this tendency
have been mentioned above). Second, the models are usually so abstract that their practical
implications are weak.
Reviewing some of the recent more qualitative literature on patent breadth, the paper
arrived at the conclusion that when technological spillovers are strong, broad patents may be
potentially hampering for the future rate of invention. In some fields of new technology, such
as genetics, the danger of too broad patents seems to be very real.
The final, admittedly somewhat paradoxical, message of the paper is therefore that patents
are of crucial importance to economic growth, but that, especially in fields where spillovers
are strong, patents should not be very broad.
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1. Introduction
The role of knowledge in the process of economic development can hardly be
underestimated. The economic history of the world sho s that, in the long run, only by
applying new production techniques and introducing new products, the level of welfare can
be increased. The development of such new processes and new products is a goal that is
actively pursued by both governments and private firms.
Research on the relation between science and technology investment on the one hand and
economic growth and development on the other hand, clearly shows that it is not only the
amount of resources that are invested that counts, but also the institutional arrangements
under which this investment takes place. One specific type of institutional arrangement that is
of great importance is that of intellectual property rights (IPRs).
This paper intends to outline some of th  issues on the relationship between IPRs and
technology transfer from developed countries to developing countries as a way of
development. This is vast area of research that has especially flourished in the last decade or
so. A comprehensive coverage of the area would require far more space and efforts than were
available for this paper. Hence, what will be attempted here is to present a short overview of
some of the theoretical and practical developments in the field, and use this overview to
discuss a number of options for future research and debate. In doing this, the perspective used
is that of an economist, for the obvious reason that this is my field of work. Other disciplines,
most obviously legal studies, have a lot to say on the topic, but I cannot pretend to be able to
do justice to them. Therefore, stimulation of thinking and constructive debate is my aim
rather than a final statement or even a complete overview of issues.
In making my points, I will largely focus on patents as the form of IPRs that are most
relevant to technological change. I will thus mostly leave aside other forms of IPRs, although
these may be important for developing countries in specific instances. Also, I will not discuss
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recent changes in patent regimes that are the result of the appearance of new technologies
(e.g., issues of patentability of life or computer programs).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of the
economic reasoning on the role of institutions in economic growth and development, leading
to the underlining of the importance of IPRs. Section 3 provides an overview of the main
factors through which IPRs have an impact on development and technology transfer. This
section also outlines the main developments at a practical level, i.e., how international IPR
regimes converged into the so-called TRIPs agreement that has been in effect since 1996.
Section 4 introduces three main points for discussion, by drawing on different parts of the
economic literature. Some specific recommendations will be made with regard to supportive
policies in the field of international IPRs. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main
conclusions.
2. The role of institutions in economic growth and development
In the 1950s, the theory of economic growth became dominated by the so-called neoclassical
model (Solow, 1956). This model argued that economic growth in a country c n be solely
explained by the accumulation of capital, the (exogenous) growth rate of the labour force, and
exogenous technical progress. Solow (1957), following a method developed earlier by
Tinbergen (1943), presented calculations on the contribution of technical progress. Solow
concluded that 88 % of the U.S. growth rate over 1909-1949 was due to technical progress.
With hindsight, the two Solow papers can be viewed as the start of an era in which
economic growth was analyzed mostly in a purely quantitative way. The work by economists
focused on those factors in economic growth that can be related to measurable phenomena.
Thus, much work was aimed at refining the measurement of labour input (e.g., by taking into
account education, or human capital), measuring capital in a better way, or proxying the
impact of technical progress by variables such as R&D expenditures.8
Although such a purely quantitative approach goes a long way in explaining differences in
economic growth between nations, it leaves certain important empirical phenomena without
explanation. Most specifically, one can point to a number of historical cases where two
different (groups of) countries seemed to be in more or less identical circumstances (i.e.,
more or less equal values for ‘measurable’ variables), but still showed widely different
behaviour in terms of economic growth. De Long (1988) discusses a number of such cases,
with Argentina versus Western European countries such as Austria at the beginning of the
century as a prime example of uneven growth. Freeman (1994) discusses the world of
differences between Latin-American and South-East Asian growth as another example.
Such examples, in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, led to a (renewed) view on
economic growth in which non-measurable factors were given a much more important role.
Freeman (1994) and Abramovitz (1994) are examples of this line of thought. Many of these
factors are discussed under the heading of ‘institutions’. North (1990) defines institutions as
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“the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, [..] the humanly devised constraints
that shape human interaction” (p. 3). In addition to formal rules (i.e., laws), North also
considers informal rules (codes of conduct as embodied in ‘culture’) as a part of institutions.
Recognition of the important role that institutions play in economic growth and development
came with the award of the Nobel Prize in economics to Douglas North, who is considered as
one of the great proponents of the economic theory on institutions.9
Abramovitz (1979) uses the term ‘social capability’ as a broad description of the set of
institutions that facilitate the international diffusion of technological knowledge to less
developed countries. Among the factors that he considers of prime importance for ‘social
capability’ are the educational system, and the financial system (banking). Education has a
direct bearing on the quality of the labour force in a country, and is thus of crucial importance
in the ability of a country’s productive system to assimilate technology from abroad.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) are another important factor in the debate on the role of
institutions in technology transfer (Yankey, 1987, Van Wijk and Junne, 1993). IPRs are the
part of legal institutions that connects most closely to the process of technology itself, and
they are considered to be necessary to provide incentives for the production of new
technology by private firms operating in a market economy. The history of IPRs dates back to
the pre-industrial era (see, e.g., David, 1993), so that all the technological developments that
took place since the first Industrial Revolution were indeed shaped by the various IPR
regimes in place in various countries throughout history. The next section discusses the role
of IPRs in development in more detail.
3. Patents and technology transfer: a short review of the debate
Patents are the form of intellectual property rights associated with technological inventions.
The main aim of a patent system is twofold: first to protect an inventor from imitation, and
hence to increase the incentive for inventive activity, and, second, to stimulate the
dissemination of technical information, so that it can be used in further inventive activity,
thereby increasing the system-wide rate of invention. The first of these two aims is well-
known, while the second is less often quoted in (popular) debates about the patent system.
The first aim (incentive for invention) stems from the fact that imitating an invention is often
much less costly than inventing, so that a fast-moving imitator might sell a new product (in
the case of a product innovation) cheaper than the innovator can. Hence, without patent
protection, innovation might not lead to profits, and thus a firm operating in the market will
lack the incentive to invest in inventive activity (R&D).10
The second aim stems from the important notion of externalities. In economic theory, an
externality arises when the social costs (in case of a negative externality) or benefits (in case
                                                                                                                               
8 A few of the most well-known references in this tradition are: J rgenson and Griliches (1967), Griliches
(1979), Maddison (1987), Denison (1966).
9 North (1990), North and Thomas (1973).
10 Note that there are also other forms of protecting inventive information, such as secrecy (especially important
for process innovations), and lead-time. These other options are discussed in more detail in my other paper for
this conference.
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of a positive externality) are larger than the private costs. In the example of innovation, the
private benefits of an innovation to the innovator are the increased profits that result from it.
The wider concept of social benefits also includes (for example) the notion that the
innovation increases the stock of general knowledge, and hence increase the effectiveness of
research by other inventors. Thus, even if these other inventors are not allowed to copy the
patented knowledge, they may derive from it important new information that leads to new
inventions. By requiring the applicant for a patent to disclose the technical information on
which the patent is based, the patent system aims not only to stimulate the generation of
externalities, but also to increase their accessibility.
Note that these two aims are somewhat in tension with each other. By increasing the scope
of patent protection one may increase the incentive for invention because imitation is made
more difficult, and hence the innovator may capture profits from a broader range of potential
applications. However, at the same time, this decreases the potential benefits of other
inventors (externalities). This trade-off plays an important role in the debate on patent
protection and technology transfer, which will now be outlined.
By technology transfer, this paper will refer to the process in which technological
knowledge developed and (first) applied in the developed countries (say, OECD countries) is
transferred to countries with lower levels of technological knowledge (as embodied in their
productive process). It has to be recognized that the latter set of countries is in fact a very
heterogeneous group, including, for example, the so-called Newly Industrialized Countries
(NICs), as well as countries with pre-industrial agricultural economies.
Broadly speaking, the literature discerns four different ways in which patents have an
impact on development and/or technology transfer (e.g., Yankey, 1987, Van Wijk and Junne,
1993).
1. Strong(er) patent protection in developing nations may increase the inventive
efforts in the developing countries themselves, and thereby increase the rate of
growth in these countries.
2. Patents allow for (international) licensing, so that firms in developing countries
may buy technology from firms in (technologically) more advanced nations
(technology transfer).
3. Strong(er) patent protection may be necessary to induce firms from developed
countries to engage in one of many different economic transactions that may lead
to technology transfer. One may think of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
exports (to developing nations) of capital goods embodying technological
knowledge, joint ventures between firms in developing and developed countries,
etc. Without some form of protection of their knowledge in the foreign markets,
firms from developed nations may choose not to engage in these activities,
because they run the risk of their knowledge being copied.
4. Developing nations that do not provide a system for protection of intellectual
property of imported technology run the risk of retaliation in terms of trade
restrictions. Especially the U.S. government has (recently) been active to enforce
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protection of intellectual property of U.S. firms by means of trade measures (Van
Wijk and Junne, 1993).
All of these reasons are not only subject to academic debate by theorists, they were and are
also subject of intense negotiations in international organizations such as the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see,
e.g., Mody, 1990, Van Wijk and Junne, 1993, and World Bank, 1998). Van Wijk and Junne
(1993) describe how in the 1960s and 1970s, the large majority of developing countries
began to oppose the implementation of a (strong) patent system in their own economies:
“Developing countries did not deny that industrial property systems could encourage
industrialization, but contended that in developing countries, due to the weak
economic and technological structures, they did not bring the desired benefits. It was
argued that in developing countries the privileges created by the industrial property
systems failed both to stimulate inventions among their own nationals and did not
encourage the rapid transfer, appropriate adaptation or widespread diffusion of
imported technology” (p. 22).
Thus, the argument was twofold: first that the technological capabilities of firms in
developing countries were too low to generate important new innovations (point 1 above),
despite the existence of a patent system, and, second, that the desired technology transfer
(points 2-4 above) did not materialize. In 1975, UNCTAD published a study (UNCTAD,
1975) that presented a lot of evidence in favour of this position. For example, the report
outlined statistical trends illustrating the marginal role of developing countries in total patents
granted in the world. Moreover, it showed that in developing countries, the large majority
(typically, more than three quarters) of patents granted was controlled by foreign firms (from
the developed world).
The argument that developing countries can hardly contribute to the advancement of the
technological frontier remains valid even today. This is related to the limited amount of
resources available in these countries, in terms of human capital, funds to be invested in
frontier research, and cumulated experience in research. Corporate R&D, and hence
patenting, is a matter of the developed nations, and within them, mostly of the five or so
largest countries (European Commission, 1998). Thus, without policy measures aimed to
increasing the indigenous research capabilities of developing countries, a patent system can
hardly be expected to be an efficient means of stimulating innovations in the poorer parts of
the world.
The role of licensing (factor 2 above) was also shown to be important only for a limited set
of countries. In order to use licensed knowledge effectively, firms in developing countries
need a certain level of technological sophistication of their own. Analogous to the point of
indigenous research capabilities raised above, this is exactly what was often lacking, due to
shortages of human capital etc. Some even went so far as to suggest compulsory licensing as
a means to effectuate technology transfer, but this is extremely difficult, because mere
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licensing without the transfer of (tacit) know how from the side of the patent holder can not
be expected to be efficient (Yankey, 1987). The ineffectiveness of compulsory licensing is
also shown by the limited number of cases of such arrangements (typically less than 5 per
country over the period of a decade, see Yankey, 1987, table 2.1).
In practice, one observes that only certain countries are able to use technology licensing as
an effective way of (inward) technology transfer. Typically, in these cases, technology
licensing goes hand in hand with the build-up of domestic technological capabilities.
Freeman (1994) discusses the case of the Korean firm Samsung, which effectively used
licensing agreements with various Western European and U.S. companies to build-up its own
technological capability. Over time, Freeman observed a rapid tendency for Samsung to
switch from reliance on licensing agreements to develops its own frontier technology. In fact,
taking R&D intensity and patenting as indicators, Korea, as well as other South-East Asian
NICs can be seen to converge rapidly to the technology frontier in the course of the 1990s
(e.g., European Commission, 1998, for recent data, and Soe e  Verspagen, 1993, for a
theoretical and empirical analysis). In general terms, the conclusion seems justified that
technology licensing may be a useful part of a policy aimed at building up local technology
capabilities, but it is only a part of such a policy.
Based on the arguments on the role of patenting in developing countries, a political
discussion took place in the 1970s and 1980s between developing countries and developed
nations, in which the issue of patent protection in developing nations was heavily debated. In
broad terms, the developing nations argued for less strong patent protection in their own
economies, while the developed world called for global strengthening of patent protection.
Van Wijk and Junne (1993) provide an overview of this debate, as well as some of the finer
(legal) details as they were discussed at various conferences organized by WIPO. They also
describe how, at the end of the 1980s, the developed nations started to pull away this debate
from WIPO, trying to integrate the issue of intellectual property rights with issues of free
trade. In practical terms, this meant that negotiations about intellectual property rights were
integrated into the Uruguay Round. This implied that negotiations about free trade were
coupled with negotiations on IPRs, leading eventually to the so-called Trade Related aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement.
The TRIPs agreement is a part of the WTO, and sets minimum levels of intellectual
property protection for the whole range of forms of IPRs (patents, copyrights, trademarks,
industrial designs, etc.). It also requires signatories to establish certain basic legal measures to
prevent infringement. Disputes over TRIPs are subject to the same settlement procedures as
WTO in general. TRIPs became effective in 1996, but developing countries are granted
several transition periods applying to specific parts of the agreement, so that it will become
fully effective only in 2006.
The TRIPs agreement means that countries that do not respect the minimum levels of IPRs
set can now expect retaliation measures in terms of trade restrictions (point 4 above). Van
Wijk and Junne (1993) point out that this is an especially effective measure in combination
with the trend found in many developing countries to switch from a policy of import
substitution to export-led growth. Obviously, export-led growth crucially depends on access
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to world markets, and hence the pressure to respect the IPR levels set by TRIPs becomes
larger.
Thus, in the late 1990s, the debate on the role of patents in technology transfer mainly
focuses on points 3 and 4 of the above list. The first two points, i.e., the (direct) impact of a
patent system on domestic inventive activity in developing nations, as well as the issue of
technology licensing, were shown to depend crucially on domestic technological capabilities.
These can only be built up by means of a broad policy which includes, besides IPRs, also
elements such as (semi-)public research facilities, education and training of the labour force,
and industrial and trade policies.
With the TRIPs agreement in effect, the consensus on the issue of IPRs and technology
transfer seems indeed to converge to the points 3 and 4 listed above. The uniform and strong
IPRs are generally considered to stimulate technology transfer by means of FDI, joint
ventures and by stimulating international trade in general. Mansfield (1993), Mansfield
(1994), Mansfield (1995) provides some empirical evidence for this assumed relationship.
The first two of these papers by Mansfield analyzes survey data obtained for 100 U.S.
firms in a range of industries. About half of the firms in this sample reported that strength or
weakness of IPRs has a strong effect on whether or not direct investment will be made. This
effect was found to be strongest in the chemicals and electrical equipment sectors, and to
apply mostly to investment related to R&D facilities and facilities to manufacture complete
products. The top countries that were reported as having too weak IPRs to permit investment
in joint ventures with local partners, were India (44% of respondents indicate IPRs are too
weak), Nigeria (33 %), Brazil (32 %), Thailand (31 %), Indonesia and Taiwan (28 %). The
same countries were reported to have IPRs too weak to permit transfer of the newest or most
effective technology to wholly owned subsidiaries, or to permit licensing of the newest or
most effective technology. Mansfield (1995) extends the survey to Japanese and German
firms, and also undertakes more sophisticated econometric testing. The findings, again, show
that weak IPRs may be an important barrier to technology transfer.
The World Bank, in its World Development Report 1998/99, also champions strong and
uniform IPRs as in the TRIPs agreement. Their empirical evidence mainly consists of the
Mansfield surveys mentioned above. Despite this apparent consensus, the acad mic debate on
the issue TRIPs is far from conclusive. Sieb ck (1990) concluded that the theory did not
provide any strong answers on how strong IPRs in developing countries should be, and that
the empirical studies on the issue were too few to allow firm conclusions. In 1992, a
conference was convened at the National Academy of Sciences in the U.S., which debated
the issues. In the proceedings, which were published as Wallerstein, Mogee et al. (1993), no
firm conclusion was reached on whether a uniform system of strong IPRs was to be preferred
over a system with international differentiation in IPRs.11 Since then, although the first of
these two variants now seems the de facto situation since TRIPs came into effect, the
theoretical debate has not supplied the final answer, as will be argued in the next section.
                                            
11 See, e.g., the contributed chapters by Sherwood (1993) and Frischtak (1993).
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4. Discussion and issues for further research
The debate that was briefly outlined in the previous section is still largely unresolved, and
more theoretical and empirical research is necessary to arrive at useful conclusions. This
section will attempt to outline three angles from which further contributions to the debate
may be made. These three points are all somewhat preliminary, and must be considered as
starting points for further research and debate, rather than finalized and testable propositions.
The first issue relates to the question of whether a patent regime with (more or less)
uniform protection levels is desirable from a point of view of total world welfare (see
Sherwood, 1993, Frischtak, 1993). In microeconomic theory, the length and breadth of
patents have been analyzed.12 The length of a patent refers to its duration, while the breadth
refers to the scope of protection.13 Nordhaus (1969) analyzed the ‘optimal’ patent length, and
concluded that this depends on variables such as the price elasticity of product demand, and
the elasticity of the extent of technical improvements with regard to R&D expenditures.
Following Klemperer (1990), the literature mostly considers the issue of patent breadth in
a context of so-called horizontal product differentiation.14 I  th s approach, technological
innovation is seen as a process that produces more variants of a consumption good. Because
consumer tastes differ, each new variant creates its own demand, without fully capturing the
market.15 A broad patent then captures a large part of the horizontally differentiated product
space.
Van Dijk (1994, chapter 7) presents a model in which two countries, which trade with
each other, choose the optimal level of patent breadth. He arrives at the following
conclusions:
“[W]hen countries place equal weight on profits and consumers’ surplus of their own
citizens (…) patent breadths are too narrow. This result reflects the existence of a
positive externality flowing from each country’s patent breadth to the profit and
consumers’ surplus enjoyed by citizens of the other country. (…) [E]xcept in very
special circumstances, equilibrium patent breadths are not identical in the two
countries. (…) Further, if equilibrium breadths are sufficiently asymmetric, there is
no symmetric patent policy that Pareto-dominates the original equilibrium” (p. 153-
4).
                                            
12 My other paper for this conference will consider these issues in somewhat more detail. Here, I only focus on
the issue of an international patent system.
13 Van Dijk (1994) also uses the concept of height, which refers to the novelty requirements.
14 With horizontal product differentiation, products are differentiated into variants that cannot be ranked in terms
of some objective quality measure, but are nonetheless distinct (for example, the commodity fruits is
horizontally differentiated into apples, oranges, etc.). With vertical product differentiation, product variants can
be ranked according to quality, e.g., French wine has a higher quality than Norwegian wine. In the latter case,
consumers will choose on the basis of quality-price ratios.
15 In terms of the example in the previous footnote, some people will always prefer oranges ove  new
(genetically engineered) variants of fruit.
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In practical terms, these results establish two main points. First, in an international context,
spillovers between countries are relevant decision variables in designing national regimes of
intellectual property rights. More specifically, national governments may want to set the
scope of protection at a broader level than they would if they based their policy just on
national considerations. Second, there is not much theoretical support for the preference of a
uniform worldwide level of patent protection (breadth) over a system with differentiated
patent breadth. Third, international coordination of the scope of patent protection (breadth)
does not necessarily lead to unequivocally ‘better’ results than a regime in which each
country sets its patent policy independently of the rest of the world.16 In fact, in iscussing his
results, Van Dijk makes the following, quite strong, statement:
“In terms of our model, one could say that the north has a high and the south has a
low innovation density. The model predicts that asymmetric innovation densities lead
to extensive patent protection in the innovation-intensive region and narrow
protection in the weaker region. This situation can indeed be observed in the world
(…). The proposal of northern countries, however, to extend their standards of
protection to the south does not Pareto-improve the global welfare if innovation
densities are too different (as they seem to be).” (p. 154-5).
Obviously, Van Dijk’s model is but one in a large literature in this field. Other models of the
role of international property rights regimes and international trade are, for example,
Deardorff (1992), Diwan and Rodrik (1991), Helpman (1993) and Chin and Grossman
(1990). All of these models are highly stylized theoretical constructs, for which one needs a
great deal of imagination to apply them to practical situations.17 Other models, such as the
one by Deardorff (1991) and the one by Diwan and Rodrik (1991) are more positive towards
the idea of strengthening global patent protection.18 All in all, the conclusion reached by
Primo Braga (1990), namely that economic theory does not provide a clear-cut answer to
many questions in relation to technology transfer and intellectual property rights, still seems
to be valid.
Nevertheless, one may draw some positive conclusions from the theoretical debate, despite
its high level of abstraction and relative indeterminancy. Even though some of the studies
quoted above are critical towards the implications of, for example, the TRIPs agreement,
there is no where near enough empirical or theoretical evidence to justify a campaign against
                                            
16 In the latter conclusion, the concept of ‘Pareto-optimality’ plays a large role in Van Dijk’s analysis. This
concept refers to the notion that it is difficult to weight individuals’ welfare level. A so-called Pareto-
improvement is one in which all individuals in the economy at least have the same level of welfare as before the
improvement, and at least one individual has a higher level of welfare. Note that this is a rather strong
requirement, because one may imagine situations in which a part of welfare of a (small) group of individuals is
‘sacrificed’ for a larger improvement in the welfare of another (larger) group.
17 See David (1993) for a general discussion of the difficulties of applying economic theory to the practice of
intellectual property rights.
18 I am afraid this is one of those situations where the (ironic) saying applies that one can always find an
economist to defend one’s position, no matter how outrageous this position is.
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TRIPs. (Also, of course, such a campaign would not have any realistic hopes of success).
Whether or not the uniform and strong IPRs in TRIPs will prove beneficial will be a matter
that may ultimately be solved by ex post empirical research. In the mean time, however, it is
clear that supportive measures in terms of technological capacity building may greatly
increase the efficiency of technology transfer, and thus, in a way, make the TRIPs agreement
more efficient.
The debate of the 1970s and 19870s already clearly showed that in order for (strong) IPRs
to be effective in developing countries, the domestic capability of these countries to generate
and use new technologies needs to be enhanced (see above). Relatedly, the model by Van
Dijk cited above points to the fact that a regime with uniform and strong worldwide IPRs
may be more efficient (in terms of welfare) when differences between countries in terms of
technological capabilities are small. The World Bank, in its most recent World Development
Report, also points to the importance of building local knowledge bases. Thus, I would argue
that TRIPs is not to be considered as the final solution to problems of technology transfer and
development, but rather as a most useful step in awareness of the importance of IPRs and
technology in general. In addition to agreements of IPRs, the developed and developing
world should continue to focus on building up domestic technological capabilities in
developing countries. IPRs play an important role in this process, but there is more to it than
just IPRs.
What role could international organizations such as the World Bank, WIPO and WTO
play in this process? WTO, although it is the platform at which TRIPs was negotiated, and at
which conflicts on TRIPs must be submitted, does not seem to be a candidate for such a role.
Its nature as a body to enhance free trade does not conform to policy goals that concern
domestic issues, such as the stimulation of R&D infrastructure. The World Bank obviously
has a task in this area, and the World Development Report contains many examples of how
this organization attempts to help build up local knowledge infrastructures.
Whether or not WIPO may play a role in this process, for me, is a matter open to debate.
On the one hand, one may argue that WIPO is an international platform, much like WTO,
which should not ‘intervene’ in local issues. On the other hand, as history has shown, the
issue of international IPRs, which is, of course, the main concern of WIPO, is indeed closely
related to domestic technology capabilities. As I have tried to argue here, the new
institutional environment (TRIPs) adds another dimension to this issue, rather than making it
obsolete. Thus, given the increased need for international attention to technology capacity
building in developing countries, one may imagine that WIPO would, in some way, address
this issue. One may think, in first instance, of initiating research aimed at clarifying some of
the issues that are still clouded, as this brief summary of the literature showed.
The second issue that I want to address in this section, in a way builds on the first one,
because it considers the issue of patent breadth. In the econometric literature on international
R&D spillovers, one of the ‘hot issues’ is the question whether or not such spillovers are
embodied in traded goods and/or FDI. Coe, Helpman et al. (1997) have forcefully argued that
R&D spillovers are indeed embodied in trade goods, while Lichtenb rg and Van
Pottelsberghe (1996) found that R&D spillovers are connected to FDI flows between
24
countries. These papers do not investigate the causal effect between embodied (either in trade
or FDI) spillovers and IPRs. Thus, a first line of research that may prove useful to the debate
outlined in the previous section could be to incorporate IPRs in such spillover  models.
However, Fagerberg and Verspagen (1998) also introduce into these models so-called
disembodied spillovers. They follow earlier work by among others Cornwall (1977) and
Abramovitz (1979) in relating these disembodied spillovers to the initial level of labour
productivity in an industry. An estimated negative sign on this variable is interpreted as
evidence of the hypothesis that relatively backward countries benefit from the international
diffusion of technology. Because a variable taking into account trade-embodied R&D
spillovers à la Coe, Helpman et l. is also present in the Fagerberg and Verspagen model, the
effect related to initial labour productivity is interpreted as disembodied spillovers.
Fagerberg and Verspagen find that in a s mple of 14 OECD countries for the period 1975-
1995, disembodied spillovers have a much stronger impact on productivity growth than trade-
embodied spillovers. In other words, the international diffusion of technology mainly takes
place through other channels than international trade in goods. Admittedly, Fagerberg and
Verspagen do not consider the effects of FDI embodied spillovers. Still, their results seem to
underline the crucial importance of spillovers through other channels than embodiment (think
of international mobility of labour, international contacts at conferences, scientific and
technical literature, patent specifications, etc.).
One important caveat must be placed with regard to the application of these results to the
relationship between technology transfer and patents. Verspagen (1991), in an empirical
model that did not include any type of embodied spillovers, found that disembodied
spillovers of the type that Fagerberg and Verspagen estimate, tend to decrease with the level
of the technology gap between two countries. In other words, for countries lagging far behind
the world technological frontier, ‘technological congruence’ (Abramovitz, 1979) may be too
low to allow them to benefit from disembodied spillovers. Thus, the results that Fagerberg
and Verspagen find may indeed be rather specific to the set of countries included in their
analysis.
Although much more research is necessary to extend the Fagerberg and Verspagen results
to the issue of North-South technology transfer (e.g., extending the set of countries in the
analysis, as well as taking into account FDI), the results do seem to point out that, to a certain
extent, free riding on foreign knowledge is possible. Whether or not such a process involves
substantial infringement on patent holders’ rights is not clear from the Fagerberg and
Verspagen analysis. However, it is well imaginable that by increasing the patent breadth,
especially in those countries benefiting from the spillovers, i.e., the developing countries,
reduces the scope for such disembodied spillovers. At the same time, according to the
arguments set out in the previous section, such stronger IPRs may stimulate trade and FDI,
and thereby increase technology transfer related to these factors. Whether or not the net effect
on the amount of spillovers taking place is positive or negative is highly speculative given the
current state of the art in this field of research.
The third and final issue that I would like to raise in this section concerns the topic of
appropriate technology. As is well-known from the development literature, not all
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technologies developed in OECD countries can readily be used in developing countries.
Many of these technologies, or at least their specific implementation, are specific to the
(advanced) needs of the societies they are developed in, or depend on infrastructures that are
not commonly found in many of the developing countries. Abramovitz (1994) has termed this
‘a lack of technological congruence’.
This implies that not all R&D efforts by firms in OECD countries are relevant for the issue
of technology transfer. In general, it is quite difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between
sectors with more or less appropriate technology. For example, although much of the research
in the electronics sector is obviously beyond the reach of many developing economies, the
relatively high-tech field of mobile telephony is a well-known example of a field where
diffusion potential is large in many developing countries, due to a low level of commitment
to an installed base of wired communication.
However, one field for which the outcomes of R&D carried out in OECD countries clearly
have large consequences for developing nations, is biotechnology (see, e.g., Acharya (1995)
and Van Wijk and Junne, 1993). The impact of biotechnology on developing countries is a
vast area of research in which I cannot claim any expertise, but I would nevertheless like to
conclude this paper with a few observations on this field.
The first observation I would like to make is that in a field where the economic relevance
of a technology is larger for developing countries than for the developed world (as one may
argue biotechnology is, tropical diseases is another, perhaps even more clear case), the
importance of IPRs in developing countries is especially high. Given that the market for
products based on these technologies is small(er) in developed countries, strong IPRs in the
developed world may simply prove to be too small an incentive to stimulate R&D (Van Wijk
and Junne, 1993).
However, the ‘old’ concern that multinational companies from the developed world gain
control over technologies that are crucial to the fate of developing countries, is also especially
large in those cases. The World Bank (World development Report 1998/99, Box 2.6 and
related text), discusses the issue of compensation when ‘bioprospecting strikes gold’.
Examples are mentioned of cases where large pharmaceutical companies from the developed
world “appropriate valuable biomedical knowledge from indigenous peoples” (WDR, Box
2.6). However, a trend is also signaled in which companies provide compensation in the form
of lump sum payments and/or royalty sharing to local communities. It seems to me that such
a trend might well be formalized into international rules to prevent such ‘reverse technology
transfer’ without adequate compensation.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has made an attempt to outline some of the crucial issues in the debate on the role
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in technology transfer. Attention was devoted mainly to
patents as a specific type of IPRs. The literature distinguishes four main reasons why strong
worldwide IPRs may be beneficial for development. First, strong IPRs may stimulate
invention in developing countries. Second, IPRs formalize opportunities for technology
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licensing by firms in developing countries. Third, strong IPRs enhance the incentive for firms
from the developed world to engage in activities that entail technology transfer, such as
foreign direct investment (FDI) and joint ventures with firms in developing countries. Fourth,
developing nations that allow infringement of IPRs of firms from developed countries run the
risk of retaliation by those countries in terms of trade policy, which hampers their prospects
for export-based growth.
With the signing of the TRIPs agreement (part of WTO), relatively strong and worldwide
uniform IPRs now seem the de facto situation. The paper provided three main points of
discussion around the issues concerning TRIPs, IPRs and development. First, it was argued
that economic theory does not provide a clear case for or against a system of harmonized
IPRs, versus one with differentiated levels of protection. However, it is clear from the theory
that the building up of domestic capabilities in the area of science and technology is an
important prerequisite for developing countries to benefit from stronger worldwide IPRs (as
implied in TRIPs). This led to recommendation that international organizations such as the
World Bank, keep this issue high on the policy agenda (which is in fact done, see the World
Development Report 1998/99). Also, it was suggested that WIPO may ake an active role in
this process by initiating research to clarify issues around IPRs and building up of domestic
technological capability.
Second, it was argued that there are many channels by which technology flows between
nations, and which are different from the channels as identified in the literature on IPRs and
technology transfer (i.e., FDI and international trade). It was argued that technology flows
may either be embodied (in trade goods, or FDI), or disembodied, and that evidence from the
developed world shows that disembodied knowledge flows are relatively important.
Increasing (worldwide) patent protection may hamper such disembodied knowledge flows,
while at the same time increasing embodied flows, leaving the net effect unclear. Again,
more (empirical) research seems to be necessary to assess the effects on technology transfer.
Third, it was argued that it may be useful to initiate negotiations to formalize proper
compensation for the use of local knowledge from developing countries by biotechnology
(and pharmaceutical) companies from the developed world.
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